GitHub - zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi: Open-source, non-custodial

SafeCoin Cryptocurrency

SafeCoin is a proposed solution that is based on a well established and time tested Bitcoin algorithm and extends it to address issues of security and deflation.
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Samourai Bitcoin Wallet & Sentinel Watch Only

The Samourai are privacy activists who have dedicated our lives to creating the software that Silicon Valley will never build, the regulators will never allow, and the VC's will never invest in. We build the software that Bitcoin deserves.
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Bitcoin Core

Bitcoin Core software’s news and discussion.
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PSA: Bitcoin.com's Wallet new releases do not currently have any publicly available source-code. Be very careful; do not trust them with funds you care about without this transparency

TL;DR: Bitcoin.com used to publicly release and track changes of their wallet's source code. Currently it is NOT true anymore for the most recent versions (5.x/6.x). Please be careful, trusting a closed-source/non-public source wallet is VERY risky for your funds.
This wallet is mainly an altcoin focused wallet nowadays, it has multiple other flaws and serious unresolved security issues.
But since it is still possible to store actual Bitcoin funds on it and it appears in the first results of a search for Bitcoin wallets (due to its name) on various App stores I've figured this post could be useful to new/unaware users.
This wallet is supposedly (hard to tell without source code) still a fork of Bitpay's CoPay wallet which is under MIT License. If this is the case authors have no obligation to publicly release the source code, but up until the last couple versions it was public and tracked on this GitHub repository.
Without any justification the new releases are now happening on a new GitHub belonging to apparently "bitcoin.jp", without any tracked source code in the repository and with only binaries available for download.
There are compressed files named "Source code" along the releases, which are empty (only containing a meaningless README file in them). Those files could easily be there to deceive people into thinking everything is like before and that the source code is still available but it clearly is not the case.
You should never use a close source wallet as it generally implies that nobody was able to independently review and audit it. Without this ability, you have no guarantee that this application is not going to leak and/or purposefully steal your private keys/seed/funds. When a wallet goes from a public open-source model to a closed source/non-public source like this wallet it is even more suspicious.
I've seen Roger Ver being asked about it multiple times on btc and he only directed users to the new GitHub, without further comments when people pointed out there was no source code there.
So please, be careful, and do NOT blindly trust this company with your funds. There are plenty of wallets that are actually open-source (with publicly available source code).
submitted by joeknowswhoiam to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

💡| Crescent Cash is an open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Cash wallet with peer-to-peer services integrated into it. It fully supports SLP tokens.You can send & receive BCH or SLP tokens anywhere ,anytime, with anyone across the world fast & for pennies, using methodes like QR codes or Cashaccounts

💡| Crescent Cash is an open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Cash wallet with peer-to-peer services integrated into it. It fully supports SLP tokens.You can send & receive BCH or SLP tokens anywhere ,anytime, with anyone across the world fast & for pennies, using methodes like QR codes or Cashaccounts submitted by ojjordan78 to Bitcoincash [link] [comments]

PSA: Bitcoin.com's Wallet new releases do not currently have any publicly available source-code. Be very careful; do not trust them with funds you care about without this transparency

submitted by joeknowswhoiam to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Why is Bitcoin.com always so late with publishing source code for their released wallets? I think it's a valid complaint.

submitted by backlogg to btc [link] [comments]

Is your wallet secure? Only 4 out of 69 Android Bitcoin Wallets are open source **and** their app can be verified to match the public source code

submitted by giszmo to btc [link] [comments]

This website checks the verifiability of #Bitcoin wallets with their Open Source code and it is amazing.

https://walletscrutiny.com
Only 4 of many wallets tested are verifiable:
GreenAddress Mycelium Wallet "Bitcoin Wallet" AirGap_it Vault
Congratulations!
Great job being done by the lead developer of the project https://twitter.com/LeoWandersleb
submitted by juansgalt to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

How NOT to deprecate a popular open source NPM library: a) Give ownership of library to hacker. b) Let him inject foreign code that steals bitcoin wallets on dependent systems. c) Chaos ensues.

How NOT to deprecate a popular open source NPM library: a) Give ownership of library to hacker. b) Let him inject foreign code that steals bitcoin wallets on dependent systems. c) Chaos ensues. submitted by otakuman to CoreCyberpunk [link] [comments]

Is there any interest and taking the popcorn-time source code and putting a Dark Wallet on top of it so that it costs 1 satoshi to watch a video? Each video would have it's own Bitcoin address, and then the money would be given to the creators, to show them the power of this.

Dark Wallet would be used so that they couldn't trace back from where the bitcoin was coming. The e-mail address of the creators would be put into the system and our modified source code would only send them the keys with information on how to access and track the money.
EDIT: SwedFTP made a Github discussion board about implementing these features, check it out here. https://github.com/popcorn-official/popcorn-app/wiki/Proposed-Features
submitted by DannyDesert to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

LOL Bitcoin Diamond getting some shade from Coinomi wallet - No open source code, no dev team, no blockchain! (SCAM)

LOL Bitcoin Diamond getting some shade from Coinomi wallet - No open source code, no dev team, no blockchain! (SCAM) submitted by increaseblocks to BitcoinScamCoins [link] [comments]

Question about paper wallet / open source codes /r/Bitcoin

Question about paper wallet / open source codes /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Technical Support • Source code of Bitcoin.com wallet?

submitted by btcforumbot to BtcForum [link] [comments]

Want to run an open source Bitcoin hardware wallet on a Yubikey Neo and code your own Java Card applications ? Tell Fidesmo

Want to run an open source Bitcoin hardware wallet on a Yubikey Neo and code your own Java Card applications ? Tell Fidesmo submitted by btchip to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Cash • Source code of Bitcoin.com wallet?

submitted by btcforumbot to BtcForum [link] [comments]

ALERT: Questionable wallet just added to Apple Store. iDev, which rebrands the breadwallet open source code and uses the same description as well. /r/Bitcoin

ALERT: Questionable wallet just added to Apple Store. iDev, which rebrands the breadwallet open source code and uses the same description as well. /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Does it make sense to have hardware wallets from several companies to minimize the risk that one of them is fraudulent, or is anything anyway open source code? /r/Bitcoin

Does it make sense to have hardware wallets from several companies to minimize the risk that one of them is fraudulent, or is anything anyway open source code? /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Has anyone actually read through any of the mostly used hardware wallets source code? /r/Bitcoin

Has anyone actually read through any of the mostly used hardware wallets source code? /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Purse Releases Open-Source Wallet Code for Philosophical Reasons /r/Bitcoin

Purse Releases Open-Source Wallet Code for Philosophical Reasons /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Current movement of the 180K "Gox coins" seems to deviate from leaked source code, as the coins have been distributed in hundreds of wallets containing varying amounts ranging from 5 [x-post /r/bitcoin]

Current movement of the 180K submitted by -Mahn to mtgoxinsolvency [link] [comments]

YES MOM AND DAD I OWN BITCOIN

YES MOM AND DAD I OWN BITCOIN submitted by psturm79 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Why isn't the Bitcoin.com wallet open-source yet?

submitted by 1MightBeAPenguin to btc [link] [comments]

Bitcoin.com Wallet app is still closed source, months after release

With all the links to any kind of source repositories stripped from Bitcoin.com, I believe they have completed their unannounced migration to a closed source development cycle. I see no reason to trust that the code is going to open up for this generation of their wallet. I will be actively discouraging people from using Roger's software going forward, since closed source solutions are all too often bad for users, and he can't be trusted to communicate his intentions with the development of end user financial software. If it opens up again, whose to say it stays that way? He has demonstrated that it will not remain open once before.
Black boxes controlling your cash is entirely against the foundational reasons for creating a peer to peer trustless currency.
submitted by ScionoicS to btc [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

5 Simple Techniques For Best Crypto currencies To Invest In 2019 - CryptX Bitcoins newest competitor Incakoin SHA-256 Compile BTC/LTC Wallet from source on Debian based systems First look at the Bitcoin source code The Only Guide to Getting started - Bitcoin - Bitcoin.org

Google results for Bitcoin QR generators: Result 2 and 3 are scams! QR codes in crypto Paying to QR address (source: news.bitcoin.com) According to cryptocurrencyfacts.com: “A QR code is a simple, fast, and secure way to share an address when transferring cryptocurrency between two devices. This is especially useful in face-to-face point-of Wasabi Wallet is an open-source, non-custodial, privacy-focused Bitcoin wallet for desktop, that implements Chaumian CoinJoin.. The main privacy features on the network level: Tor-only by default. BIP 158 block filters for private light client. Opt-in connection to user full node. Bitcoin Core Bitcoin Core is a full Bitcoin client and builds the backbone of the network. It offers high levels of security, privacy, and stability. However, it has fewer features and it takes a lot of space and memory. A mobile-exclusive software wallet, Mycelium is an open-source wallet platform with full support for Bitcoin. While it cannot be used with other cryptocurrencies at this time, it’s continually Pay faster than ever before with InstantPay. With InstantPay for Bitcoin Cash, payments move faster than Visa, Mastercard, and any cryptocurrency wallet out there. Simply set your spending threshold, scan the QR code, and your payment will auto-complete in an instant.

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5 Simple Techniques For Best Crypto currencies To Invest In 2019 - CryptX

How to compile and run BTC/LTC Wallet from source on Debian based systems. Good work! ----- Bitcoin Source Codes ----- The bitcoin Github release page - versions 0.1.5 to 0.15: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/releases A copy of the first or... Forked from Bitcoin reference wallet 0.8.5 Incakoin Wallet on Github Wallet Source Files Incakoin version v1.0.0.0-oro Incakoin-256(optimized) faster than Scrypt and faster than SHA-256 in Sphlib ... The Only Guide to Getting started - Bitcoin - Bitcoin.org A yellow paperis a document containing research study that has not yet been formally accepted or released in a scholastic journal. It occurs every 4 years or to be precise every 210000 blocks and it is a part of the validation logic in the Bitcoin source code. Bitcoin halving is important to discuss as it affects miners ...

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